After more than three and a half years of war in Ukraine, the situation in Russia is becoming increasingly tense, indicating a serious turning point. According to Nigel Gould-Davies, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and former British ambassador to Belarus, time is running out for Russia.
The elite and leadership in the Kremlin are more concerned than ever as foreign policy failures and economic problems pile up. One of the key reasons for Russia’s nervousness is its disappointment with the administration of the US President, Donald Trump, which has failed to meet the expectations of the Russian President, Vladimir Putin.
Why is time no longer on Russia’s side?
The escalation of drone and fighter jet incursions and intense attacks on Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure are not new, but their scale is unprecedented. The reason lies in Russia’s broader predicament: external circumstances, such as decisions made by the USA and Europe, are putting pressure on the Kremlin. Putin was waiting for Trump’s return, which in November brought hope for a change in US policy – withdrawal from Ukraine and Europe and an easing of sanctions. However, nine months of diplomacy have failed to meet expectations, and Russian officials admit that the spirit of the Alaska summit has evaporated. Trump’s actions – restoring relations with Volodymyr Zelensky, continuing intelligence assistance and the provision of weapons (now for a fee) – suggest the opposite. The NATO summit in The Hague in June brought warm interactions between Trump and the Europeans and a commitment by members (except for Spain, in part) to spend 5 percent of GDP on defence by 2035.
The iron rule of great powers and European economic superiority
European GDP is 10.6 times greater than Russia’s, representing an economic power gap three times greater than that between NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. From the Kremlin’s perspective, this looks like a tsunami of rising European defence spending, warns analyst Nigel Gould-Davies. According to the “iron rule” of history described by Paul Kennedy in his book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, in conflicts between great powers with vital interests, the richer side always wins because it can mobilise more resources for weapons and war production.
Europe has a clear material advantage if it perceives the war in Ukraine as a direct threat to its security. Even if it achieved only 3 percent of GDP spending on defence (instead of the targeted 5 percent), Russia would have to allocate as much as 30 percent of its GDP to maintain parity – thus far exceeding the current 7.5 percent and even the Soviet levels during the Cold War (15-20 percent), which were already a huge burden at the time.
Despite challenges such as thousands of Russian non-strategic nuclear warheads versus limited European capabilities (France and the UK) and problems of coordination and logistics between countries, trends point against Russia. It is true that China is providing economic and technological assistance to Russia, but not in sufficient financial quantities for Russia to withstand prolonged pressure and maintain a functioning economy. This further closes Russia’s window of opportunity for victory.
Russia’s strategy of desperation and internal problems
These trends are forcing the Kremlin to escalate its attacks and risks against Ukraine and Europe in order to divide the West. Russia is bombing intensively, even while Trump is accessible, showing uncompromising audacity – ever since the Istanbul talks. The previous aggression was not rational either, but recent weeks have brought a new peak of severity. Economically, Russia has not collapsed, but the sanctions are working: the measure is not chaos, but distortions. Support came from external surpluses (high energy prices after 2022) and military spending from 2023, which stimulated the short term. Now, however, costs are rising, the analyst pointed out: the non-militarised sector is stagnating, the budget is strained. Russia is avoiding mass mobilisation with expensive payments to fighters, mercenaries, and foreigners (North Korea, Cuba), which is politically painful. Additionally, high interest rates, layoffs, and inflationary bonds are causing nervousness among the elite, with quiet discussions about exits and the risks of collapse.
Gould-Davies rejects comparisons between the current conflict and proxy wars such as Vietnam or Afghanistan, where the determination of small parties overcame the resources of major powers, as the latter withdrew because their vital interests were not threatened. Here, Russia’s ambitions go far beyond Ukraine: in December 2021, Russia demanded the withdrawal of the USA from Europe and the return of NATO to its 1990 borders, indicating broader goals regarding the European security order. Russia may give verbal assurances that it has no intention of expanding, but its actions – drone and fighter jet incursions, sabotage, assassination attempts (such as on the head of Rheinmetall) – are deliberately destabilising Europe, which public opinion recognises as a direct threat.
Europe’s wealth is a huge reservoir of resources, but finance is a bottleneck: ageing societies, high debt, and social costs hamper defence spending, unlike Russia’s fiscal discipline, which allows a larger share of GDP to be spent on the military without democratic pressure. However, Russia is depleting its reserves and cannot borrow from abroad, while Putin is sending drones to frighten and divide Europe, hoping that larger countries will give in under the fear of escalation – a strategy that shows desperation if it does not create panic. Unlike during the Cold War, sabotage (damage to infrastructure, cables, pipelines) is continuous and gradual, which paradoxically strengthens European resilience by raising awareness of the risks.
The analyst believes that Russia will continue and escalate its testing of tolerance limits until the West takes concrete action: preventing incursions into its airspace, shooting down violators, protecting critical infrastructure, and improving coordination among allies. The risk is twofold: inaction normalises incursions and gradually erodes sovereignty, while intervention risks escalation. He cited the example of Turkey in 2015, which shot down a Russian aircraft in 17 seconds, sending a clear message and preventing a recurrence; if shooting down is the only effective means, it must be done, otherwise security will be undermined in the long term.
A. H.
